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Abstract
In order to facilitate greater reform in energy markets, Dodd-Frank granted the CFTC wide-
ranging powers as part of the greater mandate given to the CFTC in relation to OTC-swaps and
the daily derivatives trading activity in commodities futures and options markets. As a result,
Dodd-Frank subjected electricity market transactions—which traditionally occur under the over-
sight of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission in markets organized around independent
system operators and regional transmission organizations—to the anti-manipulation prohibitions
of the Commodity Exchange Act. Thus, differently from FERC’s regime, the post-Dodd-Frank
statutory framework opened the way for enforcement of market discipline in electricity markets
through a private right of action under Section 22 of the CEA.
This development drew strong opposition from the industry, and also caused a conflict between
courts and the CFTC in the interpretation of the relevant law. In October of 2016, the CFTC
stepped back by issuing a final exemptive order to the participants of seven national energy mar-
kets, which constitute almost the entire U.S. wholesale electricity market. The withdrawal of the
private right of action conflicts with the position previously advocated by the CFTC itself. It also
raises questions about the CFTC’s use of its exemptive powers, as the removal of a statutory right
through agency rulemaking may potentially be in conflict with the text and statutory purpose of the
CEA as amended by Dodd-Frank. The exemption not only removes an important tool in enforcing
market discipline, but also has the potential to undermine the reform efforts in the transition of
U.S. energy markets to a smart grid.
This Note will provide a history of the developments that have unfolded since the enactment
of Dodd-Frank in relation to the availability of a private right of action under the CEA in energy
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markets. The Note also analyzes commonly raised arguments against the availability of a private
right of action and presents the various counter-arguments.
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in relation to the availability of a private right of action under the CEA 
in energy markets. The Note also analyzes commonly raised 
arguments against the availability of a private right of action and 
presents the various counter-arguments. 
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INTRODUCTION 
An often overlooked yet important reform opportunity introduced by 
the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act 
(“Dodd-Frank”) relates to the regulatory landscape surrounding energy 
and power markets,1 where the supply and demand forces in the interstate 
electricity infrastructure meet on a daily basis to settle various 
transactions on energy, capacity, and transmission rights.2 In the last two 
decades, recognizing the urgent need to improve efficiency and usher 
transformation in the energy grid against rapid developments in 
technology, Congress understood the importance of price integrity in the 
energy markets and resolved to eliminate trading practices that have a 
detrimental effect on the price formation process in the energy markets, 
which often put innovative enterprises at a disadvantage against the 
                                                                                                                 
 1. See generally Steven Ferrey, Sustainable Energy, Environmental Policy, and 
States’ Rights: Discerning the Energy Future Through the Eye of the Dormant Commerce 
Clause, 12 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 507 (2004) (“Energy policy has been a primary domestic 
news story during the last two years: the Enron scandal, terrorist threats against nuclear 
power plants, the California electric energy market collapse, and the August 14, 2003 
blackout affecting fifty million people in the eastern United States. Electric energy, 
although seldom analyzed in the literature, especially compared to the column inches 
devoted to the geopolitical role of oil, is the critical resource underwriting the modern 
post-industrial economy. Without adequate and reliable electric energy, the computer 
age, the information society, many industrial processes, and even high-rise or moderate 
height buildings would be impossible. Electric power is the critical energy input in the 
American economy.”). 
 2. See generally Joel B. Eisen, Distributed Energy Resources, “Virtual Power 
Plants,” and the Smart Grid, 7 ENVT’L & ENERGY L. & POL’Y J. 191, 193 (2012) (“Given 
the urgency to address climate change, [Distributed Energy Resources (‘DERs’)] have 
become especially important as part of a portfolio of solutions to reduce fossil fuel use . 
. . in the electricity sector of the economy and adapt to the changing climate. The 
transition from reliance on large power plants to DERs must ‘occur rapidly to avert 
potentially catastrophic environmental effects.’ DERs help the electric grid by increasing 
grid reliability and resilience, making the grid less vulnerable to prolonged power 
failures. They can also reduce energy delivery losses, and reduce emissions of 
conventional pollutants. Beyond the environmental and energy advantages, there are 
social benefits, such as widespread decentralized ownership of DG facilities to empower 
consumers.” (citations omitted)); Paul L. Joskow, Creating a Smarter U.S. 
Electricity Grid, 26 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 29, 30 (2012) (“[A] smart grid may be needed 
if solar, wind, geothermal, and other renewable energy technologies are to make a sizable 
contribution to national electricity needs.”). 
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legacy energy industry.3 Dodd-Frank granted the Commodity Futures 
Trading Commission (“CFTC”) wide-ranging powers over energy 
markets within the greater mandate given to the CFTC to reform OTC-
swaps and daily derivatives trading activity occurring in commodities 
futures and options markets.4 As a result, Dodd-Frank brought electricity 
market transactions—traditionally under the oversight of the Federal 
Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC”)—additionally under the anti-
fraud/manipulation prohibitions of the Commodities Exchange Act 
(“CEA”).5 In contrast to the pre-existing FERC regime, the reformed CEA 
also allows private enforcement of market discipline in these markets 
under Section 22, which explicitly recognizes a private right of action 
against fraudulent and manipulative conduct occurring in all commodities 
markets.6 The availability of a private right of action has been widely 
opposed by the energy industry on the grounds of regulatory overreach.7 
After several years of regulatory and legal uncertainty resulting from 
conflicting judicial and administrative actions, in October 2016 the CFTC 
issued a final exemptive order to the participants of seven national energy 
markets, which constitute almost the entirety of wholesale U.S. electricity 
                                                                                                                 
 3. See generally JOHN G. KASSAKIAN ET AL., MASS. INST. OF TECH., THE FUTURE 
OF THE ELECTRIC GRID 20 (2011) (noting that Section 1301 of the Energy Independence 
and Security Act of 2007 defines the Smart Grid in thirteen different objectives that make 
up “a broad collection of ambitious goals,” citing 42 U.S.C. § 17381); Joseph T. Kelliher 
& Marie Farinella, The Changing Landscape of Federal Energy Law, 61 ADMIN. L. REV. 
611, 613 (2009) (“Part II of the Federal Power Act and the Natural Gas Act have changed 
from a regulatory scheme that controlled market power exercise by utilities, pipelines, 
and producers through classic rate regulation to a regulatory regime that controls the 
exercise of market power through reliance on a mixture of competition and regulation.”). 
 4. See 7 U.S.C. § 2 (2012). Minimum margin rules, registration, and reporting 
requirements comprise the majority of the CFTC reforms introduced by Dodd-Frank in 
relation to swap contracts. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection 
Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 7, 12, and 15 U.S.C.). 
 5. 7 U.S.C. § 6c(a)(5) (2012). 
 6. 7 U.S.C. § 25. FERC’s enforcement statute does not provide a private right of 
action. The proposal in this regard was rejected by Congress during the reforms in 2000s. 
 7. David Perlman et al., CFTC Proposal Creates Jurisdictional Controversy and 
Uncertainty in the RTO and ISO Markets, BRACEWELL (May 19, 2016), http://energylega 
lblog.com/blog/2016/05/19/cftc-proposal-creates-jurisdictional-controversy-and-uncerta 
inty-rto-and-iso-markets [https://perma.cc/844H-BN4H]. 
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markets.8 In effect, the order withdrew the statutory right of market 
participants to bring lawsuits against manipulative and disruptive trading 
practices in the relevant electricity markets.9 Although the CFTC 
continues to reserve its anti-manipulation enforcement authority in 
relation to these markets, the CFTC’s final order is remarkable, as it 
represents a retreat by the agency.10 This conflicts with its prior actions, 
which had endorsed the availability of private rights of action under the 
CEA for the participants of the exempted markets under various statutory 
and policy grounds.11 
The elimination of private enforcement is likely to undermine market 
discipline in electricity markets. FERC’s statutory authority over anti-
manipulative conduct is limited and lags behind the emerging norms in 
commodities and securities laws in relation to contemporary issues such 
as hyper-frequency trading.12 Even if the CFTC continues to have anti-
manipulation enforcement power over the exempted electricity markets, 
it is questionable whether, from a practical standpoint, the CEA’s anti-
manipulation provisions will have a wide reach over the exempted 
markets. This is for reasons such as the CFTC’s limited enforcement 
resources and the likelihood of greater deference by the CFTC to FERC 
in recognition of FERC’s role as the primary regulatory body in the 
energy markets. 
This Note aims to provide an account of the regulatory and judicial 
developments that have unfolded since the enactment of Dodd-Frank in 
relation to the availability of private rights of action under the CEA in 
energy markets. First, the Note will articulate the regulatory authority of 
the CFTC under the CEA, including under the relevant CEA anti-
manipulation provisions as amended by Dodd-Frank, and as applicable to 
electricity markets. Second, this Note will delineate the energy market-
                                                                                                                 
 8. Final Order Regarding Southwest Power Pool, Inc. Application to Exempt 
Specified Transactions, 81 Fed. Reg. 73,062 (Oct. 24, 2016). 
 9. See id. 
 10. CFTC, Q & A–FINAL ORDER ON RTO AND ISO EXEMPTION FOR CERTAIN 
SPECIFIED TRANSACTIONS (2016), http://www.cftc.gov/idc/groups/public/@newsroom/ 
documents/file/rto_iso_qa_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/5J5J-NHTF]. 
 11. See, e.g., Notice of Proposed Order and Request for Comment on an Application 
for an Exemptive Order From Southwest Power Pool, Inc., 80 Fed. Reg. 29,490 (May 21, 
2015). 
 12. See Antony E. Ghee, FERC Does Not Have Anti-Manipulation Authority in 
Financial Markets, 18 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 379 (2013); Jody Freeman & David 
B. Spence, Old Statutes, New Problems, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 63 (2014); Gregory 
Scopino, The (Questionable) Legality of High-Speed “Pinging” and “Front Running” in 
the Futures Markets, 47 CONN. L. REV. 607 (2015). 
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related exemptions granted by the CFTC after the adoption of Dodd-
Frank and the interesting developments in the relevant rulemaking 
process. Courts’ interpretation of the relevant CFTC rulemaking, which 
created a tension with the CFTC’s own interpretation regarding the 
availability of a private right of action in energy markets under Section 
22 of the CEA, will also be analyzed. 
Lastly, the Note will address the commonly raised arguments against 
the availability of private rights of action and present various counter-
arguments based on the CEA’s statutory authority, administrative law 
policy, and market theory. 
I. CEA AS AMENDED BY DODD-FRANK AND THE CFTC’S REGULATORY 
AUTHORITY OVER ENERGY MARKETS 
Dodd-Frank expanded the CFTC’s exclusive jurisdiction—which 
had included futures—to also cover swaps that are traded, executed or 
cleared on exchanges or clearinghouses.13 Prior to Dodd-Frank, energy 
products were generally accepted as “exempt commodities”14 under the 
CEA.15 Amendments under Dodd-Frank eliminated the pre-existing 
regulatory exemption for “exempt commodities,” which exempted swap 
trading by sophisticated counterparties in certain commodities (i.e., 
energy and metals products) from the entirety of the CEA, except for the 
                                                                                                                 
 13. 7 U.S.C. § 2(a)(1)(A) (2012). 
 14. An “exempt commodity” is defined as any “commodity that is not an excluded 
commodity or an agricultural commodity.” 7 U.S.C. § 1a(20) (2012). 
 15. See Exemption for Certain Contracts Involving Energy Products, 58 Fed. Reg. 
21,286, 21,294 (1993) (“The Commission . . . hereby exempts from all provisions of the 
[CEA] . . . except [provisions prohibiting manipulation of the market place of any 
commodity] in interstate commerce or for future delivery . . . [c]ontracts for the purchase 
and sale of crude oil, condensates, natural gas, natural gas liquids . . . .”). The energy 
exemption applied to transactions. Id. Even pre-Dodd-Frank, CFTC continued to exert 
anti-manipulation authority over non-transactional activities such as false advertising and 
reporting. See U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Reed, 481 F. Supp. 2d 1190, 
1198 (D. Colo. 2007) (“[B]y their terms, the exemptions are limited to contracts, 
agreements, or transactions. ‘Each of these terms [contracts, agreements and 
transactions], as commonly understood, denotes a mutual understanding between parties 
creating rights or obligations that are enforceable or are recognized at law.’ The illegal 
activity alleged in the Complaint—false reporting of market information concerning 
natural gas and attempted manipulation of natural gas price indices does not implicate an 
‘agreement, contract or transaction.’” (citations omitted)). 
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anti-fraud and anti-manipulation provisions.16 Subsequently, the CFTC 
refused to issue grandfather relief with regards to the statutory “exempt 
commodities” exemption. Instead, it addressed the relevant swap activity 
by studying particular markets in detail and issuing rules and exemptions 
as tasked by Dodd-Frank.17  
A. ENERGY TRANSACTIONS AS FUTURES AND SWAPS UNDER CEA 
The CFTC has “exclusive” jurisdiction over “accounts, agreements 
(including . . . ‘option[s]’ . . .) . . . and transactions involving swaps or 
contracts of sale of a commodity for future delivery.”18 In determining 
                                                                                                                 
 16. Notice Regarding the Treatment of Petitions Seeking Grandfather Relief for 
Trading Activity Done in Reliance Upon Section 2(h)(1)–(2) of the Commodity 
Exchange Act, 75 Fed. Reg. 56,512 (Sept. 16, 2010); Press Release, CFTC, CFTC 
Determines to Not Issue Grandfather Relief for Bilateral Exempt Commodity Swaps at 
This Time; Commits to Using Available Exemptive Authorities in the Future (Sept. 10, 
2010), http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/pr5890-10 [https://perma.cc/Z8J 
Q-6AT3]. 
 17. 75 Fed. Reg. at 56,513 (“The Commission is aware of the transformational nature 
of [Dodd-Frank] and its potential impact on the swaps industry. The Commission also 
recognizes that bilateral swaps trading activity currently conducted in reliance upon the 
CEA’s Exempt Commodity Exemption will likely become subject to any number of 
regulatory provisions implementing the requirements of the Dodd-Frank Act, including 
business conduct standards, recordkeeping and reporting requirements, and capital and 
margin requirements. Until the contents and timing of the Commission’s regulations 
affecting bilateral swaps are better known, however, the Commission has determined not 
to grant grandfather relief as it is impossible to know at this time whether such relief will 
be necessary.”). 
 18. 7 U.S.C. § 2(a)(1)(A) (2012). Sections 2(a)(I)(i) and 2(a)(I)(ii) of the CEA 
include declarations reinforcing both the FERC’s and the CFTC’s authority on energy 
market transactions, but they fail to draw a clear line except declaring absolute CFTC 
authority over transactions not occurring in a “trading facility that is not owned or 
operated by a regional transmission organization or independent system operator . . . .” 7 
U.S.C. § 2(a)(I)(ii)(II) (2012); see also Hunter v. F.E.R.C., 711 F.3d 155, 159 (D.C. Cir. 
2013) (“[I]f a scheme, such as manipulation, involves buying or selling commodity 
futures contracts, CEA section 2(a)(1)(A) vests the CFTC with jurisdiction to the 
exclusion of other agencies.”). FERC generally has jurisdiction over the interstate 
transmission of electric energy, national interconnectivity, and the interstate wholesale 
electric markets. With regards to futures contracts, FERC generally claims jurisdiction 
over transactions that result in physical delivery. See DC Energy, LLC, 138 FERC ¶ 
61,165 (2012) (requiring transactions to have “the potential for a physical transfer of 
energy” for FERC jurisdiction); Puget Sound Energy, Inc., 96 FERC ¶ 63,044 (2001); 
N.Y. Mercantile Exch., 74 FERC ¶ 61,311 (1996) (holding that electricity futures 
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whether a transaction constitutes a futures contract, the CFTC and the 
courts generally analyze the transaction “as a whole with a critical eye 
toward its underlying purpose.”19 In order to be legally enforceable, 
Section 4 of the CEA requires futures contracts to be traded on a 
commodity exchange that is designated as a contract market and 
registered as such with the CFTC.20 
Although the CEA does not define the elements of a futures contract, 
Section 1(a)(27) provides that “[t]he term ‘future delivery’ does not 
include any sale of any cash commodity for deferred shipment or 
delivery.”21 Section 2(c)(2)(D)(ii)(III)(aa) excludes from the jurisdiction 
of the CFTC “forward contracts”—defined as any sale that results in 
“actual delivery within 28 days.”22 Under the CEA, delivery usually 
requires “[t]he formal act of transferring something,” and thus requires 
handing over both possession and control of the underlying commodity.23 
Thus, exclusion from the CEA’s application requires an energy market 
transaction to meet either the definition of a “forward” contract that 
provides for deferred shipment, or “delivery” within the meaning as set 
forth by the CEA and the CFTC regulations, or to qualify for another 
exception or exemption provided by the CFTC.24 
                                                                                                                 
approved for trading by CFTC are not securities within the meaning of section 3(16) of 
the Federal Power Act, unless such a contract “goes to delivery, the electric energy sold 
under the contract will be resold in interstate commerce, and the seller is a public utility”). 
 19. CFTC v. Co Petro Mktg. Grp., Inc., 680 F.2d 573, 581 (9th Cir. 1982). 
 20. 7 U.S.C. § 6(a) (2012). 
 21. Id. § 1a(27). 
 22. Id. § 2(c)(2)(D)(ii)(III)(aa). 
 23. CFTC v. Hunter Wise Commodities, LLC, 749 F.3d 967, 978-79 (11th Cir. 
2014); see also CFTC v. Int’l Fin. Servs. Inc., 323 F. Supp. 2d 482, 495-96 (S.D.N.Y. 
2004) (“The quintessential difference between futures contracts . . . and spot and forward 
contracts . . . is that the latter two contemplate actual exchange (delivery and receipt) of 
the commodity, whether immediately . . . or at some fixed future date. By contrast, 
individuals enter into futures contracts, almost without exception, solely to speculate on 
the fluctuations in various commodities prices.”). 
 24. See Statutory Interpretation Concerning Forward Transactions, 55 Fed. Reg. 
39,188 (Sept. 25, 1990). The “Brent Interpretation,” developed by the CFTC in 1990, 
provides a facts and circumstances test in determining whether a particular transaction 
constitutes an excluded forward contract. See id. The Brent Interpretation was reaffirmed 
by the CFTC in the Swap Final Rule and accepted by the courts as a reasonable test in 
distinguishing a future contract. See Further Definition of “Swap,” “Security-Based 
Swap,” and “Security-Based Swap Agreement”, Securities Act Release No. 9338, 
Exchange Act Release No. 67,453, 77 Fed. Reg. 48,208, 48,228 (Aug. 13, 2012); 
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On the other hand, Section 1a(47) of the CEA broadly defines 
“swaps” to include not only any transaction “commonly known as a 
commodity swap,” but also any option of any kind that is for the purchase 
or sale of one or more commodities.25 In informational materials released 
on September 30, 2013, the CFTC stated that commodity options would 
generally be regulated as swaps under Title VII of Dodd-Frank.26 Similar 
to the definition of future contracts, which excludes forward contracts 
from its scope, Congress excluded from the term swap “any sale of a 
nonfinancial commodity . . . for deferred shipment or delivery, so long as 
the transaction is intended to be physically settled.”27 
Under the newly enacted Section 2(h)(7) of the CEA, Dodd-Frank 
also promulgated an end-user exception from the mandatory clearing and 
                                                                                                                 
Regulation of Leverage Transactions and Other Off-Exchange Future Delivery Type 
Instruments—Statutory Interpretation, 50 Fed. Reg. 11,656, 11,657 (Mar. 25, 1985) 
(“Commission’s Office of the General Counsel is of the view that . . . . [i]n general, these 
transactions share some of or all of the following indicia of futures contracts: they involve 
the purchase or sale of a commodity for delivery in the future at a price or pricing formula 
that is agreed upon when the transactions are initiated; they are standardized as to terms 
and conditions other than price; unlike commercial forward contracts or traditional 
installment agreements, they are undertaken primarily to assume or shift the risk of 
commodity price changes and are not generally entered into for purposes of obtaining 
delivery of the commodity, but rather are discharged through offsetting transactions or 
other buy-back arrangements.”). 
 25. See 7 U.S.C. § 1a(47)(A) (2012) (“[T]he term swap means any . . . transaction—
(i) that is a put, call, cap, floor, collar, or similar option of any kind that is for the purchase 
or sale, or based on the value, of 1 or more interest or other rates, currencies, 
commodities, securities, instruments of indebtedness, indices, quantitative measures, or 
other financial or economic interests or property of any kind; . . . (iii) that provides on an 
executory basis for the exchange . . . of 1 or more payments based on the value . . . of 
1 or more interest or other rates, currencies, commodities, securities, instruments of 
indebtedness, indices, quantitative measures, or other financial or economic interests or 
property of any kind, or any interest therein or based on the value thereof, and that 
transfers . . . in whole or in part, the financial risk associated with a future change in any 
such value or level without also conveying a current or future direct or indirect ownership 
interest in an asset (including any enterprise or investment pool) or liability that 
incorporates the financial risk so transferred, including any agreement, contract, or 
transaction commonly known as . . . (XVIII) an energy swap; . . . (XXII) a commodity 
swap . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
 26. CFTC, CFTC DIVISION OF MARKET OVERSIGHT RESPONDS TO FREQUENTLY 
ASKED QUESTIONS REGARDING COMMODITY OPTIONS (2013), https://forms.cftc.gov/_lay 
outs/PublicForms/Docs/TradeOptionsFAQ.pdf [https://perma.cc/RQT7-MAMZ]. 
 27. 7 U.S.C. § 1a(47)(B)(ii) (2012). 
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exchange requirement.28 The exception applies when one counterparty to 
the swap (i) is not a financial entity,29 (ii) uses the swap to hedge or 
mitigate commercial risk associated with its underlying business,30 and 
(iii) provides a notification to the CFTC on how it meets its financial 
obligations associated with the relevant uncleared swaps.31 
B. PROHIBITIONS ON MARKET MANIPULATION UNDER THE CEA 
Section 753 of Dodd-Frank amended Section 6c of the CEA and 
expanded the CFTC’s enforcement authority to prohibit manipulation and 
fraud in connection with any swap or a contract of sale of any commodity 
for future delivery on or subject to the rules of any registered entity.32 
Prohibited practices generally fall under two groups: price manipulation 
activities,33 and other practices that have a disruptive effect on the 
functioning of the relevant commodity market.34 
                                                                                                                 
 28. Id. § (2)(h)(7)(A). 
 29. Id. § 2(h)(7)(A)(i). CEA section 2(h)(7)(C)(i) provides that the term financial 
entity will include (i) swap dealers and security-based swap dealers, (ii) major swap 
participants and major security-based swap participants, (iii) commodity pools, (iv) 
private funds as defined in the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, (v) employee benefit 
plans as defined in the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, and (iv) 
persons predominantly engaged in banking or financial activities as defined in the Bank 
Holding Company Act of 1956. Id. § 2(h)(7)(C)(i). 
 30. 7 U.S.C. § 2(h)(7)(A)(ii) (2012). Examples can include businesses using swaps 
to hedge their business related price risk exposures in industries such as manufacturing, 
energy exploration, farming, transportation, or other commercial endeavors. See also 
Further Definition of “Swap Dealer,” “Security-Based Swap Dealer,” “Major Swap 
Participant,” “Major Security-Based Swap Participant,” and “Eligible Contract 
Participant.” Exchange Act Release No. 66,868, 77 Fed. Reg. 30,596, at 6-75. 
 31. 7 U.S.C. § 2(h)(7)(A)(iii) (2012). 
 32. Id. §§ 6c, 9, 13b. 
 33. Id. § 6c(a)(2) (“A transaction referred to in paragraph (1) is a transaction that—
(A)(i) is, of the character of, or is commonly known to the trade as, a ‘wash sale’ or 
‘accommodation trade’; or (ii) is a fictitious sale; or (B) is used to cause any price to be 
reported, registered, or recorded that is not a true and bona fide price.”). 
 34. Id. § 6c(a)(5) (“Disruptive practices—It shall be unlawful for any person to 
engage in any trading, practice, or conduct on or subject to the rules of a registered entity 
that— (A) violates bids or offers; (B) demonstrates intentional or reckless disregard for 
the orderly execution of transactions during the closing period; or (C) is, is of the 
character of, or is commonly known to the trade as, “spoofing” (bidding or offering with 
the intent to cancel the bid or offer before execution.”). 
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The reformed provisions of the CEA are striking in their width of 
prohibited practices and potentially extend the range of trading activities 
that may fall under regulatory scrutiny.35 In analyzing the price 
manipulation claims under the CEA, the courts generally conduct a deep 
inquiry into the mechanics of the trading activity.36 The new anti-
manipulation provisions include a strict liability prohibition regarding 
conduct that “violat[es] bids and offers.”37 Furthermore, the newly 
enacted statutory prohibition on “spoofing” (submitting market orders 
without an intent to enter into an actual transaction) potentially brings a 
wide range of daily market activity by professional traders under 
scrutiny.38 The CEA’s specific approach in addressing conduct like 
spoofing shows the importance Congress has placed on defining 
prohibited trading practices in order to lower the pleading standards and 
to ease plaintiffs’ onerous burden to establish price manipulation 
elements such as the “ability to effect prices” and intent to “cause artificial 
prices.”39 The CEA, as amended by Dodd-Frank, also prohibits situations 
                                                                                                                 
 35. See Rosa M. Abrantes-Metz et al., Revolution in Manipulation Law: The New 
CFTC Rules and the Urgent Need for Economic and Empirical Analyses, 15 U. PA. J. 
BUS. L. 357 (2013). 
 36. See Ploss v. Kraft Foods Grp., Inc., 197 F. Supp. 3d 1037, 1055 (N.D. Ill. 2016) 
(“For example, ‘[b]ecause every transaction signals that the buyer and seller have 
legitimate economic motives for the transaction, if either party lacks that motivation, the 
signal is inaccurate,’ . . . and using that false signal to manipulate commodity pricing can 
qualify as manipulation.” (quoting In re Amaranth Nat’l Gas Commodities Litig., 587 F. 
Supp. 2d 513, 534 (S.D.N.Y. 2008))). 
 37. 7 U.S.C. § 6c(a)(5)(A) (2012). 
 38. See U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Oystacher, 203 F. Supp. 3d 
934 (N.D. Ill. 2016) (holding that spoofing statute was not unconstitutionally vague as 
applied); United States v. Coscia, 177 F. Supp. 3d 1087 (N.D. Ill. 2016) (first criminal 
case that resulted in a conviction for “spoofing”); Meric Sar, Dodd-Frank and the 
Spoofing Prohibition in Commodities Markets, 22 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 383 
(2017); Matthew Leising, Spoofing Went Mainstream in 2015, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 21, 
2015), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-12-22/nabbing-the-rogue-algo-
inside-the-year-spoofing-went-mainstream [https://perma.cc/BH4E-633S]. Spoofing-
type activity is argued to be one of the contributing factors to the Flash Crash of May 6, 
2010. See Andrei Kirilenko et al., The Flash Crash: High Frequency Trading in an 
Electronic Market, 72 J. FIN. 967 (2017). 
 39. See Bart Chilton, Comm’r, CFTC, Statement Regarding Anti-Fraud and Anti-
Manipulation Final Rules: The Waiting (July 7, 2011), http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/ 
SpeechesTestimony/chiltonstatement070711 [https://perma.cc/T34H-PFT3] (discussing 
the difficulty of proving spoofing cases under the pre-Dodd-Frank anti-manipulation 
standard). 
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of “attempted” manipulation and therefore does not require the CFTC to 
show that the price resulting from the manipulative act was, in fact, 
artificial.40 Under Section 22, the CEA also allows private individuals to 
bring claims for damages arising from such manipulative conduct.41 
C. CFTC’S EXEMPTIVE AUTHORITY 
All transactions tied to energy commodities will be deemed a 
commodity future or option contract subject to CEA and CFTC 
regulation, unless the transaction qualifies for an exception or an 
exemption (administrative exclusion from the entirety or parts of CEA) 
set forth in the CEA and regulations issued by the CFTC through its 
rulemaking authority and interpretive guidance.42 So long as the relevant 
transaction envisions the future delivery of a certain energy product (e.g., 
electric power, rights for capacity or transmission), provides to one of its 
counterparties either an option with regards to the exact quantity of the 
underlying energy commodity to be delivered, or an optional right to 
execute a buy or sell order in the future, the transaction will be subject to 
the CEA.43 
The most important CEA exemptions of a general nature available 
for energy market transactions are the “forward contract exclusion” and 
the “end-user exception.”44 However, the CFTC has issued other 
exemptions with consequences on energy markets in exercise of its more 
special rulemaking authorities under Section 4 of the CEA. Under Section 
4(c), the CFTC has plenary authority (which pre-dates Dodd-Frank) to 
regulate commodity options differently than swaps.45 This different 
regulation has reaffirmed the availability of “trade options” exemptions 
                                                                                                                 
 40. 7 U.S.C. §§ 9, 13(a)(2) (2012); Hohenberg Bros. Co., Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 
¶ 20271. 
 41. 7 U.S.C. § 25 (2012). 
 42. See supra Section I.A. 
 43. CFTC also recently issued an interpretation that explicitly excludes certain 
forward contracts with embedded volumetric optionality from its definition of options 
and futures contracts and proposed an interpretive guidance that will recognize an 
exception for certain natural and electric power contracts. See Forward Contracts with 
Embedded Volumetric Optionality, Exchange Act Release No. 74,936, 80 Fed. Reg. 
28,239 (May 18, 2015). 
 44. 7 U.S.C. §§ 1a(47)(B)(ii), 2(h)(7) (2012). 
 45. Id. § 6(c). 
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for some non-financial companies as relief from certain reporting 
requirements and from designations as a “swap dealer” for activity related 
to physically settled commercial energy contracts.46 However, it should 
be noted that most of these exemptions only provide relief from CEA 
provisions regarding centralized clearing, registration, and reporting 
requirements.47 Anti-fraud and anti-manipulation provisions continue to 
apply to these exempted transactions as the CFTC regularly reserves the 
applicability of relevant CEA provisions and its own enforcement powers 
to exempted transactions.48 
1. Dodd-Frank Provisions Guiding the Mutual Existence of the CFTC 
and FERC 
When it comes to electricity markets, the statutory language of the 
CEA, as amended by Dodd-Frank, does not offer direct guidance on how 
to resolve potential disputes that may arise due to double regulation by 
FERC and the CFTC. First, Section 2(a)(1)(A) of the CEA provides that 
the CFTC shall have “exclusive jurisdiction . . . with respect to accounts, 
agreements . . . and transactions involving” futures contracts “traded or 
executed” on CFTC-licensed exchanges.49 Secondly, Dodd-Frank 
incorporated a saving clause into the CEA that preserves FERC’s and 
other state regulators’ authority over market activity “entered into 
pursuant to a tariff or rate schedule approved by [FERC] or a State 
regulatory authority”50 and that is “executed, traded, or cleared on a 
registered entity or trading facility owned or operated by a regional 
transmission organization [“RTO”] or independent system operator 
[“ISO”].”51 However, this does not in any way restrict the CEA’s 
applicability to such transactions.52 In order to provide a venue for 
                                                                                                                 
 46. See Commodity Options, 77 Fed. Reg. 25,320 (Apr. 27, 2012). 
 47. See id. at 25,328 (“Finally, at § 32.3(d), the interim final rule also retains for 
trade options the antifraud and anti-manipulation rules under part 180, § 23.410, the 
specific options antifraud provisions of pre-Dodd-Frank § 32.9 (renumbered herein as § 
32.4), and any other general antifraud, anti-manipulation, and enforcement provisions of 
the CEA, including but not limited to, CEA sections 2, 4b, 4c, 4o, 4s(h)(1)(A), 
4s(h)(4)(A), 6, 6c, 6d, 9, and 13.”). 
 48. See id. 
 49. See 7 U.S.C. § 2(a)(1)(A) (2012). See generally Ghee, supra note 12 (discussing 
the limitations of FERC jurisdiction over manipulative conduct in financial markets). 
 50. 7 U.S.C. § 2(a)(I)(i) (2012). 
 51. Id. § 2(a)(I)(i)(II). 
 52. See Ghee, supra note 12, at 390. 
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reconciling potential regulatory conflicts, Section 4(c)(6) authorizes the 
CFTC, subject to certain conditions, to issue exemptions from the 
“requirements”53 of the CEA for “certain transactions entered into 
pursuant to a tariff or rate schedule approved or permitted to take effect 
by FERC54 or a state regulatory authority.”55 However, the CEA limits the 
CFTC’s authority to issue an exemption under Section 4(c)(6) by 
requiring the exemption to be consistent with Sections 4(c)(1) and 
4(c)(2).56 Sections 4(c)(1) and (2) require the exemption to be aimed at 
“promot[ing] responsible economic or financial innovation and fair 
competition.”57 The CFTC must also determine that (i) the exemption 
would be “consistent with the public interest and the purposes of the 
CEA;” (ii) the transaction would be entered into solely between 
“appropriate persons” as defined in 7 U.S.C. § 6(c); and (iii) the 
exemption would not have “a material adverse effect on the ability of the 
CFTC or any contract market to discharge its regulatory or self-regulatory 
responsibilities” under the CEA.58 
                                                                                                                 
 53. In various agency actions CFTC declared that it is interpreting the statutory 
language of “requirements” under CEA as meaning CEA provisions that stipulate 
mandatory margin, reporting, and registration requirements, and not including the CEA 
provisions that include prohibitions against manipulative conduct. Thus, according to the 
CFTC’s own interpretation of its authority to grant exemptions to FERC regulated 
markets, CFTC does not have power under CEA § 4(c)(6) (7 U.S.C. § 6(c)(6)) to grant 
relief from compliance with prohibitions against manipulative conduct. See infra Section 
II.A.1. 
 54. Under the FPA, FERC can approve a tariff that is “just and reasonable.” 16 
U.S.C. § 824d(a) (2012). In defining “just and reasonable,” courts have developed a cost-
causation principle that requires FERC tariff approvals to establish that the parties 
bearing facility costs will receive benefits that are “roughly commensurate.” Ill. 
Commerce Comm’n v. FERC, 576 F.3d 470, 476-78 (7th Cir. 2009). 
 55. See 7 U.S.C. § 6(c)(6) (2012). In enacting section 4(c), Congress noted that the 
purpose of the provision was to give the Commission a means of providing certainty and 
stability to existing and emerging markets, so that financial innovation and market 
development can proceed in an effective and competitive manner. H.R. Rep. No. 102-
978, 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3179, 3213 (1992). 
 56. 7 U.S.C. § 6(c)(6) (2012). 
 57. Id. § 6(c)(1)-(2). 
 58. Id. 
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2. CFTC’s Exemptive Orders For RTO/ISO Markets Under CEA Section 
4(c)(6) 
Under its Section 4(c)(6) authority, the CFTC has thus far issued two 
exemptive orders. The first and more significant exemptive order was 
issued in March 2013 in response to a petition by six RTOs and ISOs (“the 
RTO-ISO Order”).59 The RTO-ISO Order granted the energy futures and 
swaps markets administered by these organizations60 relief from various 
mandatory margin, registration, and reporting requirements under the 
CEA—except CEA’s anti-fraud and anti-manipulation provisions—and 
preserved the CFTC’s authority to enforce these provisions through civil 
enforcement actions.61 The scope of the RTO-ISO Order also included 
transactions that fall within the Electric Reliability Council of Texas 
                                                                                                                 
 59. Final Order in Response to a Petition from Certain Independent System 
Operators and Regional Transmission Organizations, 78 Fed. Reg. 19,880 (Apr. 2, 2013). 
The petitioners constitute almost the entirety of U.S. electricity markets: three RTOs 
(Midwest Independent Transmission System Operator, Inc., ISO New England, Inc., and 
PJM Interconnection, L.L.C.) and three ISOs (California Independent System Operator 
Corporation, New York Independent System Operator, Inc., and Electric Reliability 
Council of Texas, Inc. (“ERCOT”)). See id. The only large-scale RTO that was not a 
party to the petition was Southwest Power Pool, which filed its own petition. See Notice 
of Proposed Order and Request for Comment on an Application for an Exemptive Order 
from Southwest Power Pool, Inc., 80 Fed. Reg. 29,490 (May 21, 2015). 
 60. For a background and discussion of policy issues, see Susan Kelly & Elise 
Caplan, Time for a Day 1.5 Market: A Proposal to Reform Rto-Run Centralized 
Wholesale Electricity Markets, 29 ENERGY L.J. 491 (2008) (“With the exception of the 
SPP, [all of these RTOs] currently or will soon operate, centralized day-ahead and real-
time spot markets for electric energy, as well as markets for certain ancillary services 
needed to support open access transmission service.”). 
 61. The exemption under the RTO-ISO Order is granted in particular for certain 
transactions that fall within the definitions of “Financial Transmission Rights,” “Energy 
Transactions,” “Forward Capacity Transactions,” or “Reserve or Regulation 
Transactions,” and that are offered or sold in a market administered by one of the 
petitioning RTOs or ISOs pursuant to a tariff, rate schedule, or protocol that has been 
approved or permitted to take effect by FERC or PUCT. Final Order in Response to a 
Petition from Certain Independent System Operators and Regional Transmission 
Organizations, 78 Fed. Reg. at 19,912-14. To be eligible for the exemption the party to 
the transaction must be: (1) “Appropriate persons,” as defined in section 4(c)(3)(A) 
through (J) of the CEA; (2) “eligible contract participants,” as defined in section 
1a(18)(A) of the CEA and in Commission regulation 1.3(m); or (3) “in the business of (i) 
generating, transmitting, or distributing electric energy, or (ii) providing electric energy 
services that are necessary to support the reliable operation of the transmission system.” 
Id. 
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(“ERCOT”), which is the only electric grid in the U.S. that operates 
entirely within a single state.62 Remarkably, the RTO-ISO Order as 
proposed and finalized, did not address Section 22 of the CEA63 or involve 
any discussion regarding the private right of action throughout the notice 
and comment rulemaking period.64 
In May 2015, the second exemption under Section 4(c)(6) was 
proposed by the CFTC in response to a petition by Southwest Power Pool 
(“SPP”) (“SPP Proposed Order”).65 The RTO-ISO Order and SPP 
Proposed Order are almost identical with respect to the scope of the 
exemptions they provide to the transactions taking place in the respective 
energy markets. However, the SPP Proposed Order includes an explicit 
statement by the CFTC that the private right of action for market 
participants shall continue to exist with regards to the exempted 
transactions.66 In the commentaries section of the SPP Proposed Order, 
the CFTC stated that the availability of a private right of action was a 
                                                                                                                 
 62. The ERCOT only operates in Texas, which gets about 85% of its electricity from 
the ERCOT grid. See Daniel M. Gonzales, Shockingly Certain: Why Is the Public Utility 
Commission of Texas Steadfast in Its Resolve to Keep Texas’s Energy Market 
Deregulated Amidst Turmoil?, 10 TEX. TECH ADMIN. L.J. 497, 502 (2009) (“In 1999, 
with the passage of the revised Public Utility Regulatory Act (PURA99), the Texas 
legislature changed its tune in regard to the nature of the electricity market. In PURA99, 
the Texas legislature declared that ‘[t]he legislature finds that the production and sale of 
electricity is not a monopoly warranting regulation of rates, operations, and services and 
that the public interest in competitive electric market requires that . . . electric services 
and their prices should be determined by customer choices and the normal forces of 
competition.’”); Paul B. Mohler, Has the “Complete and Permanent Bond of Protection” 
Provided by FERC Refunds Eroded in the Transition to Market-Based Rates?, 33 
ENERGY L.J. 41 (2012). See generally Christopher J. Bateman & James T. B. Tripp, 
Toward Greener FERC Regulation of the Power Industry, 38 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 275 
(2014) (discussing FERC regulation generally). 
 63. See Final Order in Response to a Petition from Certain Independent System 
Operators and Regional Transmission Organizations, 78 Fed. Reg. at 19,912. CFTC 
excepted its general anti-manipulation authority and other scienter-based prohibitions 
under CEA sections 2(a)(1)(B), 4(d), 4b, 4c(b), 4o, 4s(h)(1)(A), 4s(h)(4)(A), 6(c), 6(d), 
6(e), 6c, 6d, 8, 9, and 13 of the Act, and any implementing regulations from the 
exemption. Id. 
 64. See Final Order in Response to a Petition from Certain Independent System 
Operators and Regional Transmission Organizations, 78 Fed. Reg. at 19,880. 
 65. Notice of Proposed Order and Request for Comment on an Application for an 
Exemptive Order from Southwest Power Pool, Inc., 80 Fed. Reg. 29,490 (May 21, 2015). 
 66. Id. at 29,493. 
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matter of public importance.67 Without the agency having explicitly 
addressed the issue through notice and comment rulemaking, the 
RTO/ISO Order as well as the SPP Proposed Order could not be 
interpreted in a way that bars private anti-manipulation claims.68 
3. Aspire v. GDF: Fifth Circuit Holds that Private Right of Action is 
Unavailable Under the RTO-ISO Order 
In February 2015, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of 
Texas dismissed a private anti-manipulation lawsuit on the grounds that 
the CEA’s Section 22 private right of action was not available to the 
plaintiffs under the RTO-ISO Order.69 The lawsuit was brought by two 
trading companies alleging that the defendants, various electricity 
generators in ERCOT’s market, violated CEA’s prohibitions on 
manipulation70 by “intentionally withholding electricity generation during 
                                                                                                                 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. (“By enacting CEA section 22, Congress provided private rights of action as 
a means for addressing violations of the [CEA] alternative to [CFTC] enforcement action. 
It would be highly unusual for the [CFTC] to reserve to itself the power to pursue claims 
for fraud and manipulation—a power that includes the option of seeking restitution for 
persons who have sustained losses from such violations or a disgorgement of gains 
received in connection with such violations 50—while at the same time denying private 
rights of action and damages remedies for the same violations. Moreover, if the [CFTC] 
intended to take such a differentiated approach (i.e., to limit the rights of private persons 
to bring such claims while reserving to itself the right to bring the same claims), the RTO-
ISO Order would have included a discussion or analysis of the reasons therefore. Thus, 
the [CFTC] did not intend to create such a limitation, and believes that the RTO-ISO 
Order does not prevent private claims for fraud or manipulation under the Act. For the 
avoidance of doubt, the [CFTC] notes that this view equally applies to SPP’s Proposed 
Exemption. Therefore, [the RTO-ISO Order] also would not preclude such private 
claims.”). 
 69. Aspire Commodities, LP v. GDF Suez Energy N. Am., Inc., No. H-14-1111, 
2015 WL 500482, at *1 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 3, 2015), aff’d sub nom. Aspire Commodities, 
L.P. v. GDF Suez Energy N. Am., Inc., 640 F. App’x 358 (5th Cir. 2016), and reh’g 
denied, No. 15-20125, 2016 WL 3211288 (5th Cir. 2016). 
 70. 7 U.S.C. § 9(1), (3). 
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times of tight supply,”71 which artificially created unpredictable prices in 
the secondary futures markets.72 
In order to avoid a denial of their private right of action under the 
RTO-ISO Order for transactions in the ERCOT market, the plaintiffs 
initially built their commodity manipulation case on the alleged illegal 
conduct’s secondary effects on the Intercontinental Exchange (“ICE”), 
which was outside the scope of the RTO-ISO Order.73 However, in an 
unpublished opinion, the court rejected the lawsuit by relying on the 
explicit exemption from the CEA provisions that the RTO-ISO Order 
granted to ERCOT transactions.74 In analyzing the plain meaning of the 
RTO-ISO Order, the court interpreted its relevant carve-out provision—
which contained a list of CEA provisions that will continue to apply to 
the exempted transactions—as an exhaustive list.75 Since Section 22—
which is the private right of action provision of CEA—was not explicitly 
enumerated in the carve-out section of the RTO-ISO Order, the court 
                                                                                                                 
 71. Aspire, 2015 WL 500482, at *1. (“ERCOT balances the real time supply with 
the demand for electricity by adjusting the market price, called the Locational Marginal 
Price (‘LMP’) to incentivize more or less energy production as needed. Generators like 
Defendants offer electricity to ERCOT in price/quantity pairings of their choosing, 
known as offer curves, which ERCOT uses to balance the system by using the next 
lowest-cost energy to serve the next unit of demanded energy. Generators can change 
their offer curves throughout the day but must supply an offer curve at least one hour in 
advance. A generator can effectively prevent dispatch of its energy by offering it to 
ERCOT at prices above the LMP, but if that generator’s energy is needed, ERCOT will 
raise the LMP to attract and capture the needed energy. ERCOT’s primary regulator is 
the Public Utility Commission of Texas (‘PUCT’).”). 
 72. Id. Plaintiffs alleged numerous instances in which defendant GDF engaged in 
“economic withholding” by suddenly increasing its offer prices from their normal rates—
at times from the usual price range of $100-1000 per MWh to $5000 MWh (which is the 
maximum allowable “Locational Marginal Price” under ERCOT rules). Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. See id. at *5. Under the canon of expressio unius est exclusio alterius when 
certain items are listed in a statutory provision but other related items are omitted, courts 
infer “that items not mentioned were excluded by deliberate choice, not 
inadvertence.” Barnhart v. Peabody Coal Co., 537 U.S. 149, 168 (2003). Moreover, the 
Supreme Court has explained that ordinarily, silence does not convey any meaning, much 
less the potential for sweeping liability. See Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 
U.S. 730, 749 (1989) (“Ordinarily, Congress’ silence is just that—silence.”). 
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opined that the CFTC clearly intended the private right of action to be 
suspended by the RTO-ISO Order.76 
On appeal, the plaintiffs expanded their argument to also cover the 
transactions in the ERCOT market.77 In support of this argument, the 
plaintiffs relied on the CFTC’s May 2015 statement—found in the 
recently proposed SPP Proposed Order and the relevant CFTC 
commentary—reflecting the agency’s view that the private right of action 
shall survive the RTO-ISO Final Order.78 The Fifth Circuit rejected this 
argument based on waiver grounds and the SPP Proposed Order’s lack of 
persuasiveness as an administrative act.79 According to the Fifth Circuit, 
the RTO-ISO Order’s language was unequivocal and the SPP Proposed 
Order could not be given weight as an agency act in direct conflict with a 
final order.80 
                                                                                                                 
 76. Aspire, 2015 WL 500482, at *5 (“However, as Defendants correctly argue, 
GDF’s transactions within ERCOT are exempted transactions under the Final Order. As 
observed above, the exempted transactions include “energy transactions,” which are 
defined as transactions in a day-ahead or real time market for the purchase or sale of 
electricity, such as the transactions in this case. The Final Order exempts these 
transactions ‘from all provisions of the CEA,’ which includes 7 U.S.C. § 25 upon which 
Plaintiffs rely as the basis for their private cause of action. Moreover, § 7 U.S.C. § 25–
which is Section 22 of the CEA-is not included in the Final Order’s listing of CEA 
sections retained as part of the CFTC’s general anti-fraud and anti-manipulation authority 
and scienter-based prohibitions.”). 
 77. Aspire Commodities, L.P. v. GDF Suez Energy N. Am., Inc., 640 F. App’x 358, 
362 (5th Cir.), reh’g denied, No. 15-20125, 2016 WL 3211288 (5th Cir. 2016). 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. (“We recognize that the Commission issued the SPP Proposed Order after the 
district court decided this case, so Aspire could not have used the Order as support before 
the district court. Nonetheless, Aspire could have made the interpretive argument it 
makes now: that the Final Order should not be read to exempt ERCOT transactions from 
the private right of action provision even though that provision is not an enumerated 
exception. Even if we were to address the merits of Aspire’s interpretive argument, the 
SPP Proposed Order does not change our analysis. We do not find the Final Order 
ambiguous. Accordingly, we only consider the Commission’s interpretation of the Final 
Order as expressed in the SPP Proposed Order’s preamble for its ‘persuasive power.’ 
[citation omitted]. We do not find the Commission’s statements in the preamble of the 
SPP Proposed Order persuasive as they directly contradict the plain language of the Final 
Order.”). 
 80. Id. 
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4. CFTC Reviews Private Right of Action for RTO-ISO Markets and 
Retreats After Opposition by the Industry 
As a response to the Fifth Circuit ruling, in May 2016, the CFTC 
proposed an amendment to the RTO-ISO Order (the “Proposed RTO-ISO 
Amendment”) specifically addressing the issue of private right of action 
in exempted energy markets.81 In the Proposed RTO-ISO Amendment, 
which was issued by a 2-1 vote, the CFTC aimed to clarify the 
interpretation of the RTO-ISO Order and re-establish the availability of a 
private right of action under Section 22 of the CEA in relation to 
exempted transactions.82 In favor of the availability of the private right of 
action, the CFTC articulated five main arguments: (1) the preservation of 
“the private right of action with respect to fraud and manipulation will not 
cause regulatory uncertainty or duplicative or inconsistent regulation;” (2) 
“conflicting judicial interpretations regarding the nature of the [RTO-ISO 
transactions] would not affect the jurisdiction of FERC or any relevant 
state regulatory authority;” (3) “the private right of action in the CEA is 
instrumental in protecting the American public, deterring bad actors, and 
maintaining the credibility of the markets subject to the Commission’s 
jurisdiction;” (4) “the private right of action under CEA [S]ection 22 was 
established by Congress as an integral part of the CEA’s enforcement and 
remedial scheme;” and (5) “the Commission’s preservation of [S]ection 
22 liability with respect to the [carve-out provisions] is consistent with 
the Commission’s actions in prior 4(c) orders.”83 Commissioner 
Giancarlo, who has opposed the proposed amendment, filed a dissenting 
opinion in which he articulated the reasons of his opposition.84 According 
                                                                                                                 
 81. Notice of Proposed Amendment to and Request for Comment on the Final Order 
in Response to a Petition from Certain Independent System Operators and Regional 
Transmission Organizations, 81 Fed. Reg. 30,245 (May 16, 2016). 
 82. Timothy Massad, Chairman, CFTC, Statement in Support of the Proposed 
Amendment to the RTO-ISO Order (May 10, 2016), 
http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/Spe 
echesTestimony/massadstatement051016 [https://perma.cc/P7RT-PPV3] (“Private 
rights of action have been instrumental in helping to protect market participants and deter 
bad actors. These actions can also augment the limited enforcement resources of the 
CFTC, and serve the public interest by allowing harmed parties to seek damages in 
instances where the Commission lacks the resources to do so on their behalf.”). 
 83. 81 Fed. Reg. at 30,248-49. 
 84. J. Christopher Giancarlo, Comm’r, CFTC, Statement on the Proposed 
Amendment to the RTO-ISO Order (May 10, 2016), http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/Sp 
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to Commissioner Giancarlo, the “plain language” of the RTO-ISO Order, 
relying on which the market participants have been operating for over 
three years, was unambiguous.85 Therefore, the dissenting Commissioner 
argued that the private rights of action should not survive the exemption.86 
Furthermore, the CFTC’s action created legal uncertainty by retroactively 
applying a previously unarticulated position, without following 
rulemaking procedures.87 The Commissioner also recognized that, given 
the continuing availability of CFTC enforcement actions to seek 
restitution on behalf of aggrieved individuals, allowing private rights of 
action on top of them would unnecessarily cause electricity rate increases 
as companies would have to save for potentially expensive litigation 
matters.88 
In the following months, the proposed amendment faced intense 
criticism from various actors such as utilities companies, trade 
organizations, RTOs, and FERC staff.89 Meanwhile, the House 
Committee on Energy and Commerce, in a letter voicing the concerns 
raised by the commentators, also requested a briefing from the CFTC by 
July 15, 2016.90 The primary concern of the critics was the regulatory 
burdens and the uncertainty that may be caused by dual regulation of the 
energy markets by both the CFTC and FERC.91 The critics generally 
                                                                                                                 
eechesTestimony/giancarlostatement051016 [https://perma.cc/BBX9-J5Q2] (“It can be 
argued that private claims may serve the public interest by empowering injured parties to 
seek compensation for damages where the Commission lacks the resources to do so on 
their behalf. Yet, the extensive regulation and monitoring of RTOs and ISOs significantly 
obviates the policing role of private suits in these markets. . . . I believe that with the 
protection provided by such extensive regulatory oversight the Commission should not 
permit private litigation. Doing so would result in too many cooks in the proverbial 
oversight kitchen.”). 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. In reaching this conclusion Commissioner Giancarlo relied on a canon of 
statutory interpretation, expressio unius est exclusio alterius. See id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Dennis J. Hough, Jr., FERC Opposes Private Right of Action in CFTC 
Proceeding; Congress Requests Briefing, LEXOLOGY (July 6, 2016), 
http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=057af511-f522-4a92-8975-c683836db0 
54 [https://perma.cc/TQR9-49VW]. 
 90. Letter from Fred Upton, Chairman, House Comm. on Energy & Commerce, to 
Timothy G. Massad, Chairman, CFTC (June 24, 2016), https://energycommerce.house. 
gov/sites/republicans.energycommerce.house.gov/files/documents/114/letters/20160624
CFTC.pdf [https://perma.cc/TX4E-EWRJ]. 
 91. Hough, Jr., supra note 89. 
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argued that Congress granted FERC exclusive authority through the 
Federal Power Act (“FPA”) to enforce anti-market manipulation 
provisions with respect to the RTOs, and the FPA expressly prohibits 
private rights of action.92 Allowing the private right of action in energy 
markets would create uncertainty and costs that will negatively affect 
prices to the detriment of the users.93 
After considering numerous comments provided by the industry and 
stakeholders, the CFTC in October 2016 issued and finalized the SPP 
Proposed Order and the Proposed RTO-ISO Amendment in a joint final 
order (the “Joint Final Order”).94 Remarkably, in the Joint Final Order the 
CFTC retreated from its prior position and expanded the exemptions 
granted to RTOs and ISOs under Section 4(c)(6) to bar private actions 
that could be brought under Section 22.95 In doing so, the CFTC 
recognized its continuing enforcement authority, the special nature of the 
RTO-ISO markets, and their intensive regulation by FERC.96 More 
interestingly, CFTC also recognized that the availability of a private right 
                                                                                                                 
 92. Letter from Max Minzner, Gen. Counsel, FERC, to Christopher Kirkpatrick, 
Sec’y, CFTC (June 14, 2016), https://www.findknowdo.com/sites/default/files/news/atta 
chments/2016/06/ferccea-private-claims-rto-marketsopposition-6-14-16.pdf [https://per 
ma.cc/7SMV-3A2X]. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Final Order Regarding Southwest Power Pool, Inc. Application to Exempt 
Specified Transactions, 81 Fed. Reg. 73,062 (Oct. 24, 2016). 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. at 73,071 (“Considering all of these factors together, rather than any of these 
factors alone . . . the Commission concludes that in the limited context of activities within 
the RTO-ISO markets, there should be a complete exemption from private claims under 
CEA section 22. Initially, the Commission agrees that the unique nature of the RTO-ISO 
markets differentiates this issue from other contexts in which a private right of action is 
essential. The RTO-ISO markets are heavily regulated by FERC and PUCT, with whom 
the Commission shares jurisdiction. This regulation is ‘pervasive’ and it includes rate 
monitoring, tariff approval, authorization of market rules and pricing mechanisms, and 
real-time oversight of markets. As part of an articulated regulatory structure, these 
markets are also subject to close surveillance not only by the regulators but also by 
independent market monitors. In addition, FERC and PUCT support their regulation of 
the electric power markets with an enforcement program that includes the authority to 
order civil penalties, disgorgement, and to resettle the market. Furthermore, the 
Commission will continue to police these markets for fraud, manipulation and other 
unfair trading activities and, as contemplated by Congress, it can and will cooperate with 
these fellow regulators to deter and prevent unlawful trading activities in the RTO-ISO 
markets.”). 
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of action might conflict with the Congressional intent regarding 
electricity markets97: Congress considered the issue in 2005 in the context 
of amendments to the FPA and decided not to allow the private right of 
action in these markets.98 
II. ANALYSIS 
The CFTC’s withdrawal of the anti-manipulation private right of 
action in RTO-ISO markets might be celebrated by the energy industry at 
first sight. But the true legal and economic ramifications of this policy 
choice—and the special status given to RTO-ISO markets among other 
commodities markets—are likely to unfold in the longer term. 
A. ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF THE PRIVATE RIGHT OF ACTION’S 
AVAILABILITY 
1. Plain Meaning of the CEA: Does CEA Give CFTC The Power to 
Suspend Private Right of Action in the First Case? 
The withdrawal of the private right of action in RTO-ISO markets is 
remarkable, especially since it amounts to the removal of a statutory right 
through agency action.99 Under Chevron, reasonable agency 
interpretations are generally given deference by the courts in relation to 
issues within their regulatory jurisdiction for which a statute does not 
provide an unambiguous rule.100 
                                                                                                                 
 97. Id. at 73,072 (“In 2005, Congress amended the FPA to give FERC the authority 
to pursue manipulation of the electricity markets. At that time, Congress focused on 
whether there should be a private right of action for manipulation of these specific 
markets. Congress explicitly declined to grant such a right of action. This was a more 
particularized determination regarding the merits of private enforcement in these unique 
markets than the legislative judgment reflected in CEA section 22 that there should be a 
generally applicable private right of action for fraud and manipulation in the 
Commission’s jurisdictional markets.”). 
 98. Id. 
 99. See David S. Rubenstein, The Paradox of Administrative Preemption, 38 HARV. 
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 267 (2015) (“Administrative preemption is a convenience and 
contrivance for modern government. But, as hypothesized here, it is also a constitutional 
paradox. Administrative preemption requires that agency action simultaneously qualify 
as (1) ‘Law’ for federalism purposes and (2) ‘not Law’ for separation of powers.”). 
 100. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984); see 
also Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997) (holding unanimously that an agency’s 
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Section 4(c)(6) of the CEA provides that the Commission shall issue 
exemptions from the “requirements” of the CEA for the transactions 
entered into pursuant to a tariff or rate schedule approved or permitted to 
take effect by energy regulators.101 Thus, one needs to make a closer 
textual inquiry on what the term “requirement” actually may entail within 
the context of the CEA to answer two questions: (i) whether the CEA 
provides unambiguous guidance with regards to the scope of the CFTC’s 
exemptive powers, and (ii) in the corollary, whether the CFTC has acted 
in conflict with its authority under Section 4(c)(6). 
In the Proposed RTO-ISO Amendment, CFTC provided an overview 
of its exemptive powers under Section 4(c)(6), and stated that within the 
context of the CEA the term “requirement” usually refers to various 
regulatory registration and reporting rules applicable to commodity 
options and swap trading parties and exchanges.102 In the CFTC’s opinion 
it was dubious at best to assume a Section 22 private right of action to 
qualify as such a “requirement.”103 In bold words, the CFTC itself 
                                                                                                                 
interpretation of its own ambiguous regulation was entitled to particularly deferential 
respect); J. Lyn Entrikin Goering, The Tailoring Deference to Variety with a Wink and a 
Nod to Chevron: The Roberts Court and the Amorphous Doctrine of Judicial Review of 
Agency Interpretations of Law, 36 J. LEGIS. 18 (2010) (“The Court generally applied 
Chevron deference if a rule had been adopted in notice-and-comment proceedings, and 
otherwise defaulted to classic Skidmore analysis of various persuasive factors to 
determine whether a less formal agency interpretation warranted deference. In its final 
term, the Rehnquist Court resolved a complex issue concerning the stare decisis effect 
on agencies of judicial precedents interpreting black-letter law. In National Cable & 
Telecommunications Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Services, the Court held that an agency is 
bound by a court’s prior interpretation of a statute or rule only if the court declared its 
language unambiguous. In that event, the prior judicial interpretation controls over any 
subsequent agency interpretation to the contrary.”). 
 101. 7 U.S.C. § 6(c)(6) (2012). Section 4(c)(1) contains a broader language that 
authorizes the CFTC to grant exemptions from the CEA’s “requirements” as well as 
“from any other provision of this Act.” Id. § 6(c)(1). 
 102. Notice of Proposed Amendment to and Request for Comment on the Final Order 
in Response to a Petition from Certain Independent System Operators and Regional 
Transmission Organizations, 81 Fed. Reg. 30,245, 30,249 (May 16, 2016). 
 103. Id. (“Based on the difference in language between section 4(c)(6), under which 
the RTO-ISO Order was issued, and section 4(c)(1), the Commission notes that it is not 
clear that section 4(c)(6) provides the Commission with the authority to exempt the 
Covered Entities from the private right of action found in section 22. Section 4(c)(1) 
authorizes the Commission to grant exemptions from the Act’s ‘requirements’ or ‘from 
any other provision of this Act,’ with certain exceptions. Section 4(c)(6), by contrast, 
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declared its hesitation to conclude that the power to provide an exemption 
from Section 22 is “within the scope of the power granted to the 
Commission by section 4(c)(6).”104 The ordinary meaning of the word 
“requirement” indicates a necessity (“something that is needed or that 
must be done”) rather than a prohibition (e.g., the rules against 
manipulative practices) or in the alternative, a pre-condition to some other 
result (“something that is necessary for something else to happen or be 
done”).105 Thus, there is an argument to be made that the withdrawal of 
the private right of action for exemptions granted under Section 4(c)(6) 
may in fact be in violation of the plain meaning of the CEA’s text. 
When interpreting the Supreme Court’s case law regarding Chevron 
deference, some commentators argue that the threshold for deference to 
administrative acts may indeed be lowered if the relevant agency act 
causes major changes in a statutory program.106 The CFTC resorted to 
notice and comment rulemaking and public comments when issuing the 
relevant Final Joint Order. However, as argued by Sunstein, the 
background principles of administrative law and various non-delegation 
doctrines may require the level of deference to agency action to be 
lowered if the relevant agency action creates a large scale change in the 
                                                                                                                 
empowers the Commission to exempt agreements, contracts, or transactions from 
‘requirements’ of the Act only. It is not clear that the section 22 private right of action 
itself is a ‘requirement’ and, therefore, it is not clear that the power to provide an 
exemption from section 22 is within the scope of the power granted to the Commission 
by section 4(c)(6).”). 
 104. Id. 
 105. Requirement, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictiona 
ry/requirement [https://perma.cc/3FCP-U2YR]. 
 106. See Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187, 244–45 (2006) 
(“Agencies would not receive deference when they attempt to exercise their authority in 
ways that produce large-scale changes in the structure of the statutory programs that they 
are administering. . . . In some cases, well-established background principles operate to 
‘trump’ Chevron. Agencies are not permitted to interpret ambiguous statutes so as to 
apply beyond the territorial boundaries of the United States. Nor are agencies allowed to 
interpret ambiguous statutes to apply retroactively. An agency cannot construe an 
ambiguous statute so as to raise serious constitutional doubts. In these and other contexts, 
courts have insisted on a series of nondelegation canons, which require legislative, rather 
than merely executive, deliberation on the issue in question. Congress will not lightly be 
taken to have delegated to agencies the choice of how to resolve certain sensitive 
questions. Perhaps MCI and Brown & Williamson can be understood to build on these 
nondelegation canons to suggest a more general principle: Fundamental alterations in 
statutory programs, in the form of contractions or expansions, will not be taken to be 
within agency authority.”). 
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statutory program administered by the agency.107 In the present case, the 
CFTC’s withdrawal of the private right of action arguably constitutes an 
extreme situation cautioned by Sunstein: a generally available statutory 
right being removed through an agency order issued in response to a 
petition by various private entities and which does not strictly meet the 
definition of a general rulemaking.108 In this sense, analogies to similar 
SEC rulemaking may not hold much value either. The commodities law 
differs from the securities law in its approach to the private right of action. 
Section 22 of the CEA provides an explicit statutory authority for a 
private right of action contrary to the private right of action in securities 
laws,109 which was to a great extent developed by the courts.110 
2. Double Regulation Concerns 
Most of the arguments raised against the availability of a private right 
of action in RTO-ISO markets were centered on concerns arising from the 
prospect of double regulation by the CFTC and FERC, and the potential 
                                                                                                                 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. 
 109. For a critique of the doctrine of implied private rights of action—namely, reading 
congressional intent into a statute to enable a private right of action when there is no 
explicit congressional disposition that establishes a private right of action—see Jonathan 
A. Marcantel, Abolishing Implied Private Rights of Action Pursuant to Federal Statutes, 
39 J. LEGIS. 251 (2013). 
 110. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 737 (1975). 
Although § 10(b) does not create an express private cause of action, courts recognize an 
implied private cause of action to enforce the provision and its implementing regulation. 
15 U.S.C.A. § 78j(b); see Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2398 
(2014). For a review of private right of action in securities context, see Stanislav 
Dolgopolov, Providing Liquidity in a High-Frequency World: Trading Obligations and 
Privileges of Market Makers and a Private Right of Action, 7 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & 
COM. L. 303 (2013). For a critique of judicially created private rights of action in areas 
entrusted to agency enforcement, see Richard B. Stewart & Cass R. Sunstein, Public 
Programs and Private Rights, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1193, 1206–07 (1982) (“Judicial 
creation of private rights of action raises greater difficulties when the legislature has 
entrusted enforcement of a statutory scheme to a specialized administrative agency that 
is empowered to issue rules or to adjudicate controversies under the statute. In this 
context, private rights of action may usurp the agency’s responsibility for regulatory 
implementation, decrease legislative control over the nature and amount of enforcement 
activity, and force courts to determine in the first instance the meaning of a regulatory 
statute.”). 
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of discrepancies between the rules of the two agencies.111 These critics 
should be dealt with in two perspectives. First, double-regulation 
concerns imply that if a private right of action is available, it will impose 
on the market participants additional regulatory burdens that will conflict 
with the CFTC’s exemption regime (intra-jurisdictional conflict within 
commodities laws). Secondly, the opposition raising double-regulation 
concerns argues that the availability of a private right of action will 
interfere with FERC’s jurisdiction over the relevant energy markets 
(inter-jurisdictional conflict; conflict between energy and commodities 
regulations). However, neither side of the double-regulation argument can 
withstand a closer inquiry on whether the availability of a private right of 
action would actually increase the market participants’ compliance 
burdens. 
First—in relation to the intra-jurisdictional conflict argument—
CEA’s anti-manipulation provisions and the relevant norms continue to 
apply to exempted transactions through CFTC enforcement regardless of 
the availability of a private right of action.112 Thus, private enforcement 
will not create or change any compliance norms under the CEA for market 
participants and will not affect the relief already granted to exempted 
transactions from various other CEA provisions. Thus, the compliance 
cost-related arguments against the private right of action do not really 
have a tangible basis. On the other hand, the argument that the private 
right of action will unduly burden the market participants could be 
justified based on an assumption that the centralized CFTC enforcement 
will act as a gatekeeper for a substantial number of frivolous actions that 
will create undue costs for market participants. Yet, from a costs and 
benefits perspective, the withdrawal of private enforcement may create 
actual social wealth, only if the saved legal costs that would be incurred 
for defending against frivolous claims indeed outweighed the social 
benefits of bona fide anti-manipulation actions brought by private market 
participants. As expressed by the CFTC, the private right of action in the 
CEA is “instrumental in protecting the American public, deterring bad 
actors, and maintaining the credibility of the markets subject to the 
                                                                                                                 
 111. Hough, Jr., supra note 89. 
 112. See Final Order Regarding Southwest Power Pool, Inc. Application to Exempt 
Specified Transactions, 81 Fed. Reg. 73,062 (Oct. 24, 2016). 
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Commission’s jurisdiction.”113 The private right of action under Section 
22 was “established by Congress as an integral part of the CEA’s 
enforcement and remedial scheme.”114 Thus, it can be argued that these 
arguments are directly in conflict with the Congressional intent embodied 
in Dodd-Frank in relation to the contemplated reform agenda pertaining 
to the energy markets. This Note further addresses this issue when 
discussing regulatory efficiency and the benefits of supplemental private 
enforcement.115 
Second, the availability of a private right of action will not create an 
inter-jurisdictional conflict between the CFTC and FERC. CFTC and 
FERC regulations can—and in fact do—co-exist under the CEA as 
amended by Dodd-Frank and the Federal Energy Act as affirmed by the 
courts.116 As explained above, the CEA’s anti-manipulation provisions 
continue to apply to the exempted transactions.117 In fact, FERC’s anti-
manipulation authority was originally intended to have a broader scope 
than the CEA. After a rise in energy prices between 2002 and 2005, 
Congress enacted the Energy Policy Act of 2005, expanding FERC’s 
powers to prosecute energy price manipulation.118 The authority granted 
to FERC by this legislation incorporated the language of Section 10(b) of 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,119 rather than the language used in 
the CEA. However, as a result of the Dodd-Frank amendments, the anti-
manipulation prohibition under the CEA covers a broader range of trading 
activities—especially those that are defined by CEA as per se violations 
(e.g., spoofing)—than the FERC’s current anti-manipulation authority.120 
FERC’s statutory authority is limited in comparison to the CEA in relation 
                                                                                                                 
 113. Notice of Proposed Amendment to and Request for Comment on the Final Order 
in Response to a Petition from Certain Independent System Operators and Regional 
Transmission Organizations, 81 Fed. Reg. 30,245, 30,248–49 (May 16, 2016). 
 114. Id. 
 115. See infra Section II.A.3. 
 116. Hunter v. FERC, 711 F.3d 155, 160 (D.C. Cir. 2013). (“But [FEA Section 4A’s] 
text fails to answer the question whether FERC may intrude upon the CFTC’s exclusive 
jurisdiction. More importantly, because FERC is free to prohibit manipulative trading in 
markets outside the CFTC’s exclusive jurisdiction, there is no ‘irreconcilable conflict’ 
between the two statutes and therefore no repeal by implication.”). 
 117. See supra note 112 and accompanying text. 
 118. 16 U.S.C. § 824v (2012). 
 119. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2012). 
 120. See Hunter, 711 F.3d at 160; Joel B. Eisen, FERC’s Expansive Authority to 
Transform the Electric Grid, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1783, 1849 n.249 (2016). 
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to the types of unlawful conduct that constitutes price manipulation—as 
an example, spoofing is illegal only under CEA.121 In today’s 
interconnected markets, many parties enter into a wide range of financial 
contracts tied to various energy market-related prices and indexes. This 
increases the need for harmonious implementation of the applicable 
regulatory standards ensured by the actions of all interested parties, public 
and private. A sweeping withdrawal of private rights of action may create 
regulatory gray zones, where certain unlawful conduct may escape the 
oversight of both FERC and CFTC as demonstrated in the Aspire case—
where the plaintiff’s initial claim was based on an injury that occurred in 
a connected secondary derivatives market. As seen in Aspire, FERC’s 
jurisdiction does not reach derivatives markets and parties who transact 
in derivative markets without ever becoming a direct party to the relevant 
RTO or ISO transaction.122 Thus, manipulative conduct occurring in a 
RTO/ISO market may have the potential to affect prices of contracts that 
are outside the RTO/ISO market, and vice versa. 
To further demonstrate how FERC’s regulatory web may be 
potentially short over substantial secondary market activity, under the 
FERC-approved rules of ERCOT, “[a] single generation entity that 
controls less than 5% of the installed generation capacity in ERCOT . . . 
is deemed not to have ERCOT-wide market power.”123 The defendant in 
Aspire controlled about five percent of Texas’ market share.124 By 
entering into a Settlement Agreement and Voluntary Mitigation Plan with 
the [Texas market authority], the defendant obtained “an absolute defense 
against an allegation pursuant to [Texas law and the market authority’s 
                                                                                                                 
 121. See 7 U.S.C. § 6c(a)(1)-(2) (2012) (prohibiting any “offer to enter into, enter 
into, or confirm the execution of a transaction” that “is used to cause any price to be 
reported, registered, or recorded that is not a true and bona fide price”); id. § 6c(a)(5) 
(prohibiting trading that (i) “violates bids or offers;” (ii) “demonstrates intentional or 
reckless disregard for the orderly execution of transactions during the closing period;” or 
(iii) “is, is of the character of, or is commonly known to the trade as, ‘spoofing’ (bidding 
or offering with the intent to cancel the bid or offer before execution)”); id. § 13(a)(2) 
(prohibiting actions “caus[ing] [the delivery/transmission of] false or misleading or 
knowingly inaccurate reports concerning crop or market information or conditions that 
affect or tend to affect the price of any commodity in interstate commerce”). 
 122. Aspire Commodities, LP v. GDF Suez Energy N. Am., Inc., No. H-14-1111, 
2015 WL 500482, at *1 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 3, 2015), aff’d sub nom. Aspire Commodities, 
L.P. v. GDF Suez Energy N. Am., Inc., 640 F. App’x 358 (5th Cir. 2016), and reh’g 
denied, No. 15-20125, 2016 WL 3211288 (5th Cir. 2016). 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. 
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regulations] of an abuse of market power through economic 
withholding.”125 This requirement of substantial market power as a 
condition to have an actual ability to manipulate market price more 
closely follows the outdated price manipulation concept of antitrust laws, 
and trails behind the emerging norms of market regulation in securities 
and commodities laws. As demonstrated by events such as the flash crash, 
in today’s markets where sophisticated trading tools are more and more 
available to the general public, even a single trader with modest resources 
may have a disproportionate capacity to disrupt the price integrity of a 
market.126 
Furthermore, as will be explained below, price distortion in 
electricity markets creates impediments for the strategic planning of 
smaller market entrants, which generally consist of renewable and 
alternative energy companies. Thus, the necessity to create the correct 
incentives during the transition of the U.S. energy infrastructure into a 
smart grid makes high enforcement standards regarding anti-
manipulation authority an absolute priority to mitigate the associated 
losses. In any case, withdrawal of the private right of action cannot 
remedy the dichotomy inherent to the existing dual regulatory structure. 
3. Regulatory Efficiency 
The issue of regulation by private enforcement is usually dealt with 
by answering one question: will the co-existence of private and public 
enforcement cause inconsistent sets of policies for implementing a statute 
that should apply uniformly nationwide?127 In the relevant literature and 
case law, it is generally accepted that courts should not create private 
causes of action for violations of “agency-administered statutes because 
adjudication of such cases inevitably requires judges to make policy 
decisions that should be made by agencies.”128 However, where the statute 
explicitly provides for a private right of action, it is legally questionable 
                                                                                                                 
 125. Id. 
 126. See Michael Lewis, Crash Boys, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 24, 2014), https://www.bloo 
mberg.com/view/articles/2015-04-24/michael-lewis-has-questions-about-flash-crash 
[https://perma.cc/HD5P-DQ77]. 
 127. Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Role of the Judiciary in Implementing an Agency 
Theory of Government, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1239, 1270 (1989). 
 128. Id. at 1243. 
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whether such right can be suspended by an agency action.129 In the present 
case, it is widely argued that FERC’s regulation should have a primary 
role over the relevant markets to ensure a coherent policy agenda. 
However, this argument ignores both the shortcomings of FERC’s 
authority and Congress’ clear intent in placing the energy markets under 
dual regulation, both by FERC and the CFTC.130 
From a market governance policy perspective, the CFTC’s 
withdrawal of private action in exempted markets represents a deliberate 
choice in favor of “exclusive public enforcement” and a rejection of the 
potential benefits of a more balanced “supplemental private right of 
action” approach.131 From a regulatory policy perspective, the most 
important benefits of the supplemental private right of action approach 
are (i) greater compliance with the norms due to greater deterrence caused 
by the potential of private lawsuits, and (ii) lower costs for the agency due 
to the allocation of litigation costs between private claimants and the 
regulatory agency.132 Thus, the unavailability of private right of action 
                                                                                                                 
 129. Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 717 (1979) (“When Congress intends 
private litigants to have a cause of action to support their statutory rights, the far better 
course is for it to specify as much when it creates those rights. But the Court has long 
recognized that under certain limited circumstances the failure of Congress to do so is 
not inconsistent with an intent on its part to have such a remedy available to the persons 
benefited by its legislation.”). 
 130. Renee Labuz, Shareholders’ Rights to a Cause of Action Under the Investment 
Company Act of 1940 Following Exxon Mobil v. Allapattah, 39 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 
1521, 1542 (2006) (“Had Congress not intended there to be a private right of action, it 
certainly would have amended the statute to so state or would have argued such during 
one of the Act’s many floor discussions.”). 
 131. See Stewart & Sunstein, supra note 110, at 1215. 
 132. Stewart & Sunstein, supra note 110, at 1214-15 (“Public regulation may be 
needed because of the inadequacies of the common law system in coping with industrial 
conditions. Public enforcement is, however, frequently inadequate because of budget 
constraints; private actions can be a useful supplementary remedy by providing additional 
enforcement resources. J.I. Case Co. v. Borak reflects these considerations. The Supreme 
Court created a private right of action under section 27 of the Securities and Exchange 
Act of 1934 on behalf of shareholders challenging management’s proxy statements as 
deceptive, notwithstanding the power of the SEC to bring suit and the failure of Congress 
explicitly to authorize private enforcement. The Court emphasized the Act’s ‘broad 
remedial purposes’ as well as the apparent inability of the SEC to effectuate those 
purposes adequately. The Court did not discuss the possibility that private enforcement 
might subvert political control over enforcement. Instead, the Court asserted that the 
statutory goal of ‘protection of investors’ . . . implies the availability of judicial relief 
where necessary to achieve that result. Private rights of action, unlike rights of initiation, 
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may undermine optimal compliance with the anti-manipulation 
provisions of the CEA.133 On the other hand, although the exclusive public 
enforcement approach lacks these benefits, it is often desirable from the 
perspective of a regulatory authority due to the greater deference it 
provides to the agency in shaping the relevant case law with virtually 
absolute authority in (i) deciding which lawsuits are to be litigated before 
the courts, and (ii) shaping the development of the relevant legal doctrines 
through direct control over the litigation strategy.134 Furthermore, the 
exclusive public enforcement approach can be desirable for the CFTC to 
maximize the agency’s role as a central repository for all information 
regarding potential violations of the CEA through the agency’s new 
whistleblower program. 
Yet, from a normative perspective, it is yet to be seen whether the 
refusal of the private right of action will help in achieving the greater 
integrity in energy markets envisaged by Dodd-Frank. Furthermore, the 
inevitable transformation from legacy energy networks into the smart grid 
necessitates the leveling of the playing field, which requires 
harmonization in regulatory norms and a homogenous enforcement 
environment.135 In the long term, asymmetries in regulatory norms and 
compliance behavior may undermine the transformation of the U.S. 
economy towards greater efficiency and sustainability.136 
                                                                                                                 
do not divert limited agency resources from other violations that may be more important.” 
(citations omitted)). 
 133. Brianne J. Gorod, The Sorcerer’s Apprentice: Sandoval, Chevron, and Agency 
Power to Define Private Rights of Action, 113 YALE L.J. 939, 944–45 (2004) (“[T]he 
ability of agencies to expand upon statutorily created private rights of action can also be 
important in those instances when Congress explicitly creates a private right of action.”). 
 134. Id. at 1218 (quoting a court endorsing this approach in the context of FTC 
regulations in Holloway v. Bristol-Myers Corp, 485 F.2d 986 (D.C. Cir. 1973)). 
 135. For FERC’s indifference towards environmental considerations, see Christopher 
J. Bateman & James T. B. Tripp, Toward Greener FERC Regulation of the Power 
Industry, 38 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 275, 275 (2014) (“America’s electricity industry is at 
the heart of some of the nation’s and world’s biggest environmental challenges, including 
climate change. Yet the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission . . . which has regulatory 
jurisdiction over wholesale sales and transmission of electricity in interstate commerce 
and is charged with ensuring that rates and other aspects of the industry are ‘just and 
reasonable,’ has an official policy of excluding environmental considerations from its 
regulation of the industry.”). 
 136. Gabe Maser, It’s Electric, but FERC’s Cost-Causation Boogie-Woogie Fails to 
Justify Socialized Costs for Renewable Transmission, 100 GEO. L.J. 1829, 1830 (2012) 
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Developments like rapid technological changes, sophistication of 
daily trading firms that rely on speculative strategies, and the ongoing de-
centralization of the energy transmission networks require regulators to 
provide adequate protections to new incomers and smaller cap 
enterprises.137 Due to public enforcement’s limited resources, private 
enforcement can play an important supplementary role to eliminate anti-
competitive and predatory trading practices, which undermine the price 
discovery function of energy markets and increase the risks borne by 
smaller enterprises.138 
4. Effects on Secondary Markets Doctrine: Anti-manipulation Private 
Right of Action’s Reach on Secondary Markets and the Case Law on 
Foreign Exchange Exemption 
The Fifth Circuit’s approach in Aspire, which precipitated the 
CFTC’s retreat, was possibly in conflict with the existing commodities 
case law that dealt with jurisdictional questions regarding secondary 
                                                                                                                 
(“When a new plant is necessary, the market decides what type of plant is built. The 
advent of renewable energy has brought a twist to this status quo. Renewable energy is 
not cost competitive with fossil-fuel power without state or federal subsidies. Consumers 
in states that have chosen to promote renewable energy may end up supporting 
renewable-energy development through their state tax dollars—and, perhaps 
unexpectedly, through their electric bills as well. This distribution of cost results because 
the cost of the transmission needed to connect to a renewable-power facility can be shared 
among ratepayers who ‘benefit’ from that power. These costs are not insubstantial. 
Electricity lines cost millions of dollars per mile. With this amount of money at stake, 
consumers deserve transparent and balanced mechanisms to ensure they truly benefit 
from what they are paying for.”). 
 137. See Jody Freeman & David B. Spence, Old Statutes, New Problems, 163 U. PA. 
L. REV. 1, 62–63 (2014) (“Yet to promote competition, FERC forced the unbundling of 
electric power generation and transmission in interstate markets only, stopping short of 
exerting similar authority over retail markets traditionally governed by the states. To 
create incentives for additional transmission capacity, FERC has bootstrapped its 
authority over rates in numerous creative ways yet has eschewed more aggressive 
mandates over market design. Under the auspices of its rate-setting authority, FERC 
midwifed the birth of new regional institutions capable of managing the increasingly 
complex electricity grid, but never required the states to join them. Finally, FERC has 
sought to force wholesale markets to be more welcoming to renewable resources and 
demand response, taking risks that it believes will survive judicial scrutiny. All of these 
efforts have involved interpretations of eighty-year-old statutory language written by a 
Congress that could not have imagined most of the problems FERC now faces.”). 
 138. See generally Craig Pirrong, Energy Market Manipulation: Definition, 
Diagnosis, and Deterrence, 31 ENERGY L.J. 1 (2010). 
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markets. Ultimately, the CFTC, by withdrawing the private right of action 
in exempted markets, sided with the holding of the Fifth Circuit in Aspire. 
Yet, in Aspire the court’s dismissal of the claim was partially grounded 
upon the argument that the plaintiff’s injury did not have a sufficient level 
of proximity to the alleged manipulative trading patterns because, 
although the suspect transactions took place in the exempted ERCOT 
market, the defendant was not transacting in ERCOT directly and the 
injuries he suffered in transacting in the ICE market were secondary in 
nature.139 Since the resulting price change on ICE was an indirect 
consequence of the defendant’s activities, and the defendant did not 
directly enter into any transactions on the ICE market, secondary market 
trading alone was insufficient to support an independent claim.140 
Interestingly, in In re Foreign Exchange Benchmark Rates Antitrust 
Litigation, a joint antitrust and CEA manipulation case was filed before 
the Southern District of New York in relation to a manipulative act in the 
exempted forex OTC market based on the effects of these acts on the 
related secondary markets.141 The defendants relied on Aspire to defend 
against the private action.142 However, the court rejected the defendants’ 
motion to dismiss based on prior precedents that allowed claims brought 
for misconduct occurring in physical natural gas and petroleum markets 
affecting the exempted derivatives markets.143 The court found that the 
plaintiff sufficiently alleged a direct relationship between currency prices 
in the spot market and the value of each FX futures contract. Since 
“futures prices [and options prices] [were] based on and derived 
arithmetically from spot prices,” the claim was sufficient in showing the 
defendants’ ability to influence FX futures and options prices for a CEA 
                                                                                                                 
 139. Aspire Commodities, L.P. v. GDF Suez Energy N. Am., Inc., 640 F. App’x 358, 
362 (5th Cir.), reh’g denied, No. 15-20125, 2016 WL 3211288 (5th Cir. 2016). 
 140. Id. 
 141. In re Foreign Exch. Benchmark Rates Antitrust Litig., No. 13 Civ. 7789 (LGS), 
2016 WL 5108131, at *17 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 2016). Foreign currency transactions are 
excluded from CEA under the explicit authority of 7 U.S.C. § 2(c)(1)(A). 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. (first quoting Dunn v. CFTC, 519 U.S. 465, 473 (1997) (“Congress’ broad 
purpose in enacting the Treasury Amendment was to provide a general exemption from 
CFTC regulation for sophisticated off-exchange foreign currency trading . . .”); then 
citing CFTC v. Paragon FX Enters., LLC, Nos. 11 Civ. 7740(FM), 11 Civ. 7741(FM), 
2015 WL 2250390, at *1-2 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 2, 2015) (summarizing legislative history)). 
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anti-manipulation case.144 The court strongly distinguished Aspire as 
unbinding authority, stating that it did not “read in the Aspire opinion an 
intent to create a blanket rule that manipulation claims cannot lie where 
the manipulative acts took place entirely in exempt markets.”145 The court 
reasoned that “such a rule would be overbroad, and would ‘frustrate[] the 
CEA’s primary purpose of preventing and deterring price 
manipulations.’”146 
The aforementioned cases demonstrate the regulatory difficulties 
faced by lawmakers and agencies in drawing rules, especially in 
consideration of today’s interconnected financial markets. In today’s 
economy, where algorithmic trading, passive ETFs based on various 
commodity indexes, and various forms of other derivative transactions 
have become conventional investment tools, a more holistic and 
integrated approach to anti-manipulation enforcement policy holds the 
key to preventing market asymmetries and unfair regulatory arbitrage 
opportunities.147 
5. Floodgates Argument to Prevent Strike Actions 
The most popular argument against the availability of private anti-
manipulation actions in energy markets is based on a belief that allowing 
private actions will create an unfair burden on market participants who 
will then incur the legal costs necessary to defend against frivolous cases. 
This argument seems to closely follow the similar concerns that have been 
raised in the securities law domain in response to the excess of speculative 
lawsuits. This led to the adoption of the Private Securities Litigation 
Reform Act of 1995 (“PSLRA”) by Congress, which elevated the 
pleading standards for a prima facie case of securities manipulation.148 
However, a closer analysis of the issue reveals that the mechanics of anti-
                                                                                                                 
 144. Id. at *21. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. at *19 (quoting Parnon Energy, 875 F. Supp. 2d at 243). 
 147. See Frank Partnoy, Financial Derivatives and the Costs of Regulatory Arbitrage, 
22 J. CORP. L. 211, 227 (1996); Erich Schanze, Hare and Hedgehog Revisited: The 
Regulation of Markets That Have Escaped Regulated Markets, 151 J. OF INST. AND 
THEORETICAL ECON. 162, 162 (1995); Andrei Shleifer, A Theory of Yardstick 
Competition, 16 RAND J. ECON. 319, 319-20 (1985). 
 148. See Stephen J. Choi & Robert B. Thompson, Securities Litigation and Its 
Lawyers: Changes During the First Decade After the PSLRA, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1489, 
1489 (2006). 
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manipulation cases differ significantly in the commodities law domain 
from historical, economic, and legal perspectives. 
Issues of the excessive private actions in securities usually arise in 
the context of derivative lawsuits. The PSLRA aims to curb frivolous 
lawsuits which do not necessarily represent a certain shareholder’s 
financial interests. Similar to the shareholder disputes context, these 
lawsuits generally stem from the perverse incentives that certain members 
of the plaintiffs’ bar may have in pursuing legal fees by filing cases 
against a corporation whose shares are owned by the lawyer’s client.149 
Thus, the wide availability of private rights of action in shareholder and 
securities litigation poses the risk of destroying value by creating an 
artificial divergence between the best interests of a corporation and its 
shareholders. Researchers found that the lower thresholds for private 
securities actions and the potential liability risk affected the valuations of 
many companies negatively, especially in high-risk industries and growth 
companies.150 Thus, in the securities context, private actions may pose 
significant conflicts of interest (among the legal profession, corporations, 
and both large and small shareholders), as the filing of lawsuits often has 
a direct effect on the stock price of the defendant company. Furthermore, 
the relative ease of meeting pleading standards, such as the standard to 
overcome a motion to dismiss, necessitates heightened norms. However, 
in practice, it is questionable whether the adoption of the PSLRA 
achieved the desired results. There is at least some evidence that 
demonstrates an increase in the number of lawsuits brought in the post-
PSLRA era together with an increase in the average amount of damages 
sought and lengthened settlement periods.151 
                                                                                                                 
 149. The problem of value destruction by shareholder disputes is even more acute in 
the M&A context. See Jill E. Fisch, Sean J. Griffith & Steven Davidoff Solomon, 
Confronting the Peppercorn Settlement in Merger Litigation: An Empirical Analysis and 
a Proposal for Reform, 93 TEX. L. REV. 557, 560 (2015). 
 150. See Marilyn F. Johnson, Karen K. Nelson & A.C. Pritchard, In re Silicon 
Graphics Inc.: Shareholder Wealth Effects Resulting from the Interpretation of the 
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act’s Pleading Standard, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. 773, 
777 (2000). 
 151. Choi & Thompson, supra note 148, at 1497; Michael A. Perino, Did the Private 
Securities Litigation Reform Act Work?, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 913, 913 (2003) (“The 
picture that emerges from studying these data is that the PSLRA did not work as intended. 
The article demonstrates that as many, if not more, class actions are filed after the Act as 
before. High technology issuers remain at significantly greater risk than issuers in other 
industries. There is statistically significant evidence, however, that suggests that the Act 
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On the other hand, in the commodities context, excessive private 
litigation does not pose the same risks as in the securities context. For 
example, contrary to that in the securities domain, a private anti-
manipulation action in commodities is brought not against the issuer of a 
certain security, but against a trader who acts in breach of the CEA’s anti-
manipulation norms when trading a covered commodity. Thus, it is 
unlikely for prices in the commodity markets to be affected by the filing 
of a private lawsuit against a certain trader of the relevant commodity, as 
the price of the underlying commodity is generally independent from the 
commodities trader’s liability risk. Although, in the context of the energy 
markets, liability risks faced by energy producers may cause an increase 
in energy prices, a private right of action does not alter the relevant 
compliance norms which must be adopted by the relevant market 
participants regardless of the availability of private rights of action. The 
CEA anti-manipulation provisions continue to apply to energy producers 
through CFTC enforcement. 
Contrary to the pleading standards in the securities context prior to 
the PSLRA, proving price manipulation in the commodities context was 
already quite difficult in the commodities context prior to Dodd-Frank.152 
In fact, the adoption of independent statutory causes of action for 
manipulative activity, such as “violation of bids” and “spoofing” reflects 
a conscious effort by Congress to lower the relevant pleading standards 
to improve market discipline in the commodities markets.153 
                                                                                                                 
improved overall case quality at least in the circuit that most strictly interprets one of the 
Act’s key provisions, a heightened pleading requirement. The data also demonstrate that 
Congress did not achieve its goal of increasing the filing delay in class actions. Actions 
are filed as quickly now as they were before the Act’s passage. Nonetheless, that too may 
provide indirect evidence that plaintiffs’ attorneys are selecting more apparent cases of 
fraud that require less prefiling investigation.”). 
 152. Chilton, supra note 39. 
 153. See Sar, supra note 38. Spoofing-type activity is argued to be one of the 
contributing factors to the flash crash of May 6, 2010. See Kirilenko et al., supra note 38; 
Lewis, supra note 126 (“On the day of the flash crash, Sarao never actually sold stocks. 
He was trying to trick the market into falling so that he could buy in more cheaply. But 
whom did he fool with his trick? Whose algorithms were so easily gamed that they 
responded to phony sell orders by creating a crash? Stupidity isn’t a crime. Still, it would 
be interesting to know who, at this particular poker table, on this particular day, was the 
fool.”). 
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B. POTENTIAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE NEW REGIME 
1. CFTC As a Central Hub for Anti-Manipulation Actions 
Exemption from the private right of action will cause the CFTC to 
take center stage in the enforcement of the CEA’s anti-manipulation 
provisions with respect to energy markets. This will enable the agency to 
exert greater control over the development of anti-manipulation case law 
with respect to the energy markets. Anti-manipulation cases in the 
commodities context often require extensive economic analysis of market 
data, which is not always fully available to private plaintiffs. Thus, it is 
important for the CFTC to have greater influence in developing case law 
and interpreting the various new norms introduced by Dodd-Frank. 
Furthermore, the CFTC as a standalone gateway for enforcement 
actions will significantly reduce the informational asymmetry that usually 
undermines the viability of private actions in complex cases. Usually, 
private plaintiffs have limited means to analyze and access market data, 
undermining the private litigants’ chances of accessing and providing 
sufficient evidence to prove manipulative conduct.154 Furthermore, many 
markets have obligatory arbitration provisions for disputes arising among 
their members. These restrictions greatly limit the ability of private 
litigants to enforce market manipulation cases.155 Thus, the new regime 
                                                                                                                 
 154. This is especially true when considering the prominence of hyper frequency 
trading in today’s markets. See U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Oystacher, 
No. 15-CV-9196, 2016 WL 3693429, at *15 (N.D. Ill. July 12, 2016) (“Algorithmic 
traders include a variety of participants, ranging from brokerage firms who seek favorable 
trade executions on behalf of clients entering long-term investment positions or hedges 
to proprietary firms who trade on a principal basis in pursuit of short-term profit 
opportunities.”); RICHARD HAYNES & JOHN S. ROBERTS, CFTC, AUTOMATED TRADING 
IN FUTURES MARKETS 1 (Mar. 13, 2015), http://www.cftc.gov/idc/groups/public/@econo 
micanalysis/documents/file/oce_automatedtrading.pdf [https://perma.cc/PV8B-PCZQ] 
(“Recent studies on automated trading in domestic markets have found that often over 
half of the trades on securities and futures exchanges make some use of algorithms . . . to 
match trades, oversee certain order types (e.g.[,] stop orders)[,] and monitor general 
market risk.”). 
 155. See HTG Capital Partners, LLC v. Doe, No. 15 C 02129, 2016 WL 612861, at 
*1 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 16, 2016). The plaintiff in HTG Capital Partners issued a non-party 
subpoena to CME Group that operates CBOT and CMEX exchanges to identify the 
anonymous counterparties allegedly involved in manipulative conduct, and provide the 
relevant market data pertaining to the suspicious activity. Id. This subpoena was 
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may at least improve the quality of anti-manipulative enforcement, since 
in addressing allegations of manipulative conduct, the agency is arguably 
better placed to access the market data and has expertise in policing 
violations involving sophisticated forms of manipulative trading activity. 
It will also increase efficiency in monitoring manipulative market 
behavior, since the agency will receive more complaints, which will in 
turn positively impact the ongoing research and studies to better 
understand the conduct that is detrimental to the healthy functioning of 
electricity markets. 
However, the realization of the aforementioned positive externalities 
will largely depend on whether the CFTC will have the necessary 
resources and staff to duly and fairly address the increasing number of 
complaints, which the agency will surely receive. Despite its very broad 
jurisdiction over numerous markets and a wide range of trading activities, 
the CFTC has a significantly lower budget in comparison to the SEC. 
Additionally, the operational difficulties that may arise due to the 
agency’s limited resources and staff may result in selective enforcement 
and unfairness in regulating the relevant energy markets. Furthermore, as 
the sole enforcer of the CEA, the CFTC’s involvement with energy 
markets shall continue to cause tensions between FERC and the CFTC, 
which may cause the agency to act more cautiously and selectively in 
enforcement actions. 
2. Potential Increase in and Importance of the Whistleblower Reports 
In realizing the aforementioned efficiencies, an important vehicle for 
the CFTC to monitor and police manipulative activity in commodities 
markets will be the newly established whistleblower program.156 Under 
the whistleblower program, the CFTC is authorized to grant monetary 
awards to parties who provide the agency with original information 
regarding manipulative conduct. The reported original information must 
substantially contribute to the filing or litigation of a successful 
                                                                                                                 
challenged by the defendants on privacy grounds to which motion CME joined. Id. 
Subsequently, the anonymous defendants moved to compel arbitration under CBOT rules 
as required for the resolution of disputes arising between CBOT members. Id. The court 
ultimately granted both defendant’s motion to proceed anonymously and the motion to 
compel arbitration after in camera review of the relevant evidence documenting the 
defendants’ membership to the CBOT. Id. 
 156. 7 U.S.C. § 26 (2012); 17 C.F.R. § 165 (2016) (the rules and requirements of the 
whistleblower program). 
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enforcement action.157 Reports sent to the CFTC whistleblower office are 
strictly confidential, and the whistleblowers will benefit from special 
protections against potential retaliation. It is not necessary for a 
whistleblower to have an employment relationship or other type of insider 
status with the trader who is allegedly involved in manipulative conduct. 
Any market observer, regardless of direct injuries suffered due to the 
manipulative conduct, can qualify as a whistleblower. This broad 
availability of whistleblower status can further solidify the agency’s 
position as a central informational hub, since the whistleblower awards 
may provide compensation to some extent for the injuries a market 
participant has suffered from the manipulative conduct. It may also 
further encourage independent market participants and institutional 
traders to monetize the important information they may have in relation 
to suspicious patterns in the market.158 In fact, some of the first successful 
spoofing cases were initiated by whistleblower reports, confirming the 
feasibility of the new regime so long as the CFTC has the means and 
resources to properly study and respond to whistleblower reports.159 
 CONCLUSION 
The virtual suspension of private rights of action in relation to the 
exempted energy markets cannot be justified under regulatory cost-
effectiveness grounds (as a prevention of double regulation) as popularly 
voiced before Congress and the agency. To the contrary, the lack of 
private enforcement as a market discipline tool in the exempted energy 
markets, which consist of the majority of U.S. electricity grids, inhibits 
                                                                                                                 
 157. 17 C.F.R. § 165.14 (2016). The monetary award’s value will vary between ten 
and thirty percent of the monetary sanctions successfully imposed in the resulting judicial 
or administrative action depending on various factors such as the quality of the original 
information and its contribution to the bringing of a successful enforcement action. Id. § 
165.8. 
 158. See generally Matthew Leising & Janan Hanna, Can a $24 Billion Hedge Fund 
Blow the Whistle? Citadel Thinks So, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 26, 2016), https://www.bloom 
berg.com/news/articles/2016-04-29/can-a-24-billion-hedge-fund-blow-the-whistle-
citadel-thinks-so [https://perma.cc/GJG7-VMMU]. 
 159. Consent Order, CFTC v. Nav Sarao Futures Ltd. PLC, No. 15-cv-3398 (E.D. Ill. 
Nov. 14, 2016), http://www.cftc.gov/idc/groups/public/@lrenforcementactions/documen 
ts/legalpleading/enfsaraoorder111416.pdf [https://perma.cc/A3AU-VHZU]. 
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the important reform efforts in the energy markets.160 Indeed, sole 
regulation by FERC is likely to cause the electricity markets to lag behind 
the various market reforms promulgated in the CEA. The regulatory 
framework of FERC falls short of the heightened standards introduced by 
Dodd-Frank in relation to trading in the commodities markets. 
However, the CFTC’s retreat is also an opportunity for the agency to 
prioritize fully utilizing its own enforcement capacity. CFTC’s new 
whistleblower program provides an important conduit and monetary 
incentive for private individuals to contribute in the enforcement process, 
and greater public awareness in this regard will increase compliance 
standards. Without the availability of a private right of action, the CFTC 
will be also in a more advantageous position to exert direct control over 
the developing case law involving commodities market manipulation. 
 
                                                                                                                 
 160. See Bradley J. McAlllister, Prioritizing Demand Response: How Federal 
Legislation and Technological Innovation Changed the Electricity Supply Market and 
the Need to Revitalize FERC Order 745, 15 U. PITT. J. TECH. L. POL’Y 162, 162 (2015) 
(“The wholesale electric power network, or grid, delivers the product on which modern 
life depends, but it is the last major network to hold out against fundamental change. Over 
the past ten years, the federal government has committed billions of dollars to update the 
nation’s grid. These updates are redefining the way electric power is sold and creating 
business opportunities for new entrants in the power supply market. However, new 
entrants are facing strong opposition from traditional power utilities and independent 
power producers.” (citations omitted)). 
